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Heidegger the Magic Empiricist
Reeves Jordan

You are only coming through in waves
Your lips move, but I can't hear what you 're saying
I have become comfortably numb
-Pink Floyd

Abstract
Amidst the waves of analysis concerning Martin Heidegger and his work, there
have been few who have argued that Heidegger is an empiricist, one who believes that we
gain knowledge primarily through experience. However, through reading of Heidegger's

Being and Time and comparison of his ideas with those of the empiricist William James, I
have found that Heidegger investigates the nature of human existence with a decidedly
empirical method, and also that he describes humans as beings who understand
themselves empirically. Ergo, I argue in this essay that Heidegger is indeed an empiricist,
and that there is a potent empirical alliance between Heidegger and others like William
James. This alliance is one which could bring back to the discipline of philosophy a focus
on issues which deeply affect our experience and which have a significant impact on how
we live our lives.

3

As I set out to write this essay, a great fear envelops me. I am merely a student,
after all; what chance is there that I am fit to speak on vital matters of philosophy? Is
there not far more that I should know? This fear is heightened by the fact that my people,
philosophers, often produce an unfortunately significant amount of bullshit, both the kind
where we say things that are not true and the kind where we are not clear enough for the
reader to determine what the hell is going on in the first place. 1
Philosophers have a penchant for complexity, which makes sense, as we have
chosen a profession which requires chasing ideas down rabbit trails full-time. We like to
make up new words, we like to redefine old words, we like to categorize and
differentiate, categorize and differentiate, ad nauseam. Furthermore, these things that we
do are necessary; the universe is complex sometimes, and we have taken it upon
ourselves to make sense of the universe as much as we can.
Sadly, we get lost in our complexity from time to time. When we use jargon that
is thoroughly inaccessible to our readers, when we remove ourselves from reality so
much that we begin to count pins on the heads of angels, then we lose ourselves. What is
the use of philosophy if it has no effect on life? Little, I believe. And when we remove
ourselves into the wilderness of the completely abstract, then we begin to write bullshit,
either because our statements are not true, when checked with reality, or because they are
too abstruse for our readers to even begin to make sense of them. Meanwhile our readers,

1

See Harry Frankfurt's On Bullshit (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005) for a lucid discussion of
how bullshit plagues us in manifest ways.

4
lulled into indifferent sleep by the fact that they cannot penetrate our conceptual-jargon
talk and they have no reason to try to, become comfortably numb.
What is the remedy for our malaise? I believe that if we begin to write clearly
about matters that have connection to how real people live their real lives, we will find
ourselves again. So despite this fear of mine, this fear that I will produce just another
empty essay in the storied tradition of philosophical bullshit, I will attempt to do
something better. I do not know if I will succeed; I figure it is worth a shot.
I would like to convince you, in the next fifteen pages, that Martin Heidegger is
an empiricist. First, let us define empiricism. I will use Margaret Atherton's helpful
descriptions in defining the concept. Atherton says first that empiricism is a doctrine in
which "there are no mental contents that cannot be derived from sensation or reflection."2
This pointedly does not include intuition as a means of gaining "mental contents," that is
to say, knowledge. After all, intuition, the "just knowing" of something, would be
knowledge that occurs before any element other than the individual and his or her mind
enter the picture, and therefore as Peter Markie says is "knowledge gained independently
of sense experience."3
Atherton also says that empiricism assumes "that knowledge is advanced through

I
!I
I

experience."4 This will exclude purely abstract and purely logical ways of thinking from
the possibility of producing knowledge, for these, like intuition, are modes of forming
knowledge which are contained in the mind alone. With intuition and pure logic

Margaret Atherton, Introduction to The Empiricists: Critical Essays on Locke, Berkeley, and Hume
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), viii.
3
Peter Markie, ''Rationalism vs. Empiricism," The Stanford Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy, Fall 2008
Edition, ed. Edward N. Zalta.
4
Atherton, viii.
2
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5
excluded, which together make up the core of empiricism's ideological foe rationalism,5
what we are left with is the belief that anything that we know is developed from what we
learn from the world around us, that is to say, from our experience .
I have one more preliminary note in the way of introducing the contents of my
essay. I have a second major player, the empiricist William James, who I will include in
the last few pages as an ally to Heidegger in this project of empiricism. I would like to
show how both Heidegger and James are up to things that can make philosophy real
again. But first I will show why Heidegger is an empiricist.
I

We have to begin by understanding Heidegger's project, method and language. I
will focus my essay exclusively on Heidegger's beliefs as expressed in Being and Time,
his magnum opus.
The project of Being and Time is to uncover, understand and describe being,
human being in particular.6 The word that Heidegger uses for human being is Dasein, 7

which as Michael Inwood points out, is simply the German da (there, then, since, etc.)
affixed to sein (being), meaning "to be there, present, available, to exist," a sort of there
being.8

Heidegger's method for understanding Dasein is phenomenological.
Phenomenology is what Heidegger calls "the science of phenomena," the word
phenomena being Greek for everything that could appear to us, what Heidegger calls "the

t
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Markie.
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Macquarrie and Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, I 962),
19.
7 Ibid, 32.
8
Michael Inwood, A Heidegger Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, I 999), 42.

6

6
totality of what lies in the light of day or can be brought to the light."9 Furthermore,
phenomenology is opposed to understanding phenomena through abstraction that is
divorced from reality, and instead seeks to understand phenomena as it is. Heidegger
describes it thus:
The term 'phenomenology' expresses a maxim which can be formulated as 'To
the things themselves!' It is opposed to all free-floating constructions ... it is
opposed to taking over any conceptions which only seem to have been
demonstrated... 'phenomenology' means ... to let that which shows itself been
seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself." 10
Furthermore, as Hubert Dreyfus has noted, Heidegger is not interested in
investigating everything, like dogs and balloons and chairs and so forth; he is interested
in phenomena which require work to be shown, which are not naturally revealed, which
are hidden. 11 For Heidegger, Dasein is just such a phenomenon, for who among us
understands human being? In our abstraction about Being, Heidegger says, we have
removed ourselves even farther from any real understanding. 12 Heidegger's hope is to
apply the phenomenological method to ontology, the study of being, 13 for
"Phenomenology is our way of access to what is to be the theme of ontology, and it is our
way of giving it demonstrative precision. Only as phenomenology, is ontology
possible." 14

9

Ibid, 50-51.
Ibid, 50, 58.
11
Dreyfus, 32.
ii Heidegger, 24.
13
See Macquarrie and Robinson, translators' footnote on page 31: "Ontological inquiry is concerned
rimarily
with Being."
f4
Heidegger, 60.
10
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Heidegger's language for describing Dasein is colorful, specialized, and largely
composed of new words. There are many dozens of Heideggerian terms that I do not have
time to explain, but there is time enough to look at three. The most crucial for this essay
will be the concept of Being-in-the-world, which is what Heidegger declares to be the
fact that we find ourselves unavoidably enmeshed in the world around us, "[alongside]
the world in the sense of being absorbed in the world." 15 A second major concept is

potentialityfor-Being, the fact that it is central to our existence to seek new possibilities
as part of our dynamic being, for "Dasein is the possibility of Being-free for its ownmost
potentiality-for-Being." 16 This potentiality-for-Being means that we are averse to
removing ourselves from our cycle of continual investment in possibilities in order to
understand our being, for "Dasein comports itself towards it [its Being] ... even if this is
only the mode of fleeing in the face ofit and forgetfulness thereof." 17
A third major concept is care. Because we are potentiality-for-Being, and because
we are Being-in-the-world, we always exist in a relationship to the world and the entities
in the world (people, animals, objects, etc.) that we could call care. 18 In other words, we
never act in an objective or detached fashion, as if such a thing could be more than a
dream, for "no sooner has Dasein expressed anything about itself to itself, than it has
already interpreted itself as care." 19
We may now tum to the reasons for why Heidegger is an empiricist. There is a
crucial distinction I must make here, for there are two different arguments I could make. I
could argue that Heidegger is an empiricist because his me/hod of examining Dasein is
15

Ibid, 80.
Ibid, 183.
17
Ibid, 69.
18
Ibid, 238.
19
Ibid, 227.

16
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empirical; I could also argue that Heidegger is an empiricist because he describes Dasein
as a phenomenon which understands itself empirically. In fact I will argue both
independently.
First we will see how Heidegger describes Dasein as a being which understands
itselfempirically. I have two reasons for this: ( 1) Heidegger describes Dasein as a being
which understands itself prior to formal analysis, and (2) Being-in-the-world requires that
Dasein' s understanding-of-itself is developed from sense experience.
The evidence for (1) is in the most crucial chapters of Being and Time,
"Understanding and Interpretation"20 and "The Hermeneutical Situation at which we have
Arrived for Interpreting the Meaning of the Being of Care."21 Here Heidegger swims out
of his great ocean of description for a moment in order to outline a justification for his
project and method.
Heidegger responds in these chapters to the problem of the hermeneutic circle,
which is the fact that his understanding of Dasein is not logical because he begins with
Dasein, being, as he is, a part of Dasein.22 His response is to say that such circularity is
inevitable for us, since we are after all seeking to understand ourselves, for "An entity for
which ... its Being is itself an issue, has, ontologically, a circular structure. "23 He further
argues that even those critics who would say that they have removed themselves into
abstraction in order to have a logical understanding of Dasein are still acting as Dasein,
and exhibiting care for themselves and their beliefs:

20

Ibid, 188.
Ibid, 358.
22
Ibid, 362.
23
Ibid, 195.
21

9
We cannot ever 'avoid' a 'circular' proof in the existential analytic, because such
an analytic does not do any proving at all by the rules of the 'logic of
consistency'. What common sense wishes to eliminate in avoiding the 'circle', on
the supposition that it is measuring up to the loftiest rigour of scientific
investigation, is nothing less than the basic structure of care ...the 'charge of
circularity' itself comes from a kind of Being which belongs to Dasein.24
And why is this, that even when we desire to be abstract and objective about
ourselves we still act as the individual humans that we are? Heidegger's explanation is
that we understand ourselves "in a pre-ontological manner"25 and only afterwards
understand ourselves formally:
In indicating the formal aspects of the idea of existence we have been guided by
the understanding-of-Being which lies in Dasein itself. Without any ontological
transparency, it has nevertheless been revealed that in every case I am myself the
entity which we call Dasein ... Dasein understands itself as Being-in-the-world,
even if it does so without adequate ontological definiteness ...Dasein ...has
already understood ilself.26
Now we need the evidence for (2). As things stand it seems that Heidegger could
be arguing that Dasein understands itself by intuition or by experience; the above
passage, taken independently, could easily support either interpretation.
The vital factor here is Being-in-the-world, which denies for Heidegger the
possibility of intuitive knowledge of ourselves. Being-in-the-world, as I stated above, is
Heidegger's concept for the fact that we are unavoidably enmeshed in the world. This is a
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid, 363.
26
Ibid, 361.
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concept which has massive significance in his project, for it is absolute in denying the
possibility of any escape from our unity with the world:
The compound expression 'Being-in-the-world' indicates in the very way we have

ti

coined it, that it stands for a unitary phenomenon .. .lt is not the case that man 'is'
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and then has, by way of an extra, a relationship-of-Being towards the 'world' - a
world with which he provides himself occasionally. Dasein is never 'proximally'
an entity which is, so to speak, free from Being-in, but which sometimes has the

•

inclination to take up a 'relationship' towards the world. Taking up relationships
towards the world is possible only because Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is as it

8
8
8
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is.21
Given that intuitive knowledge is knowledge which originates in the mind alone,
as we established above, we cannot believe that Heidegger is claiming that we understand

"

ourselves by intuition, for there is no time or space in which we could understand

'9

phenomenon which encapsulates us mentally just as much as it does physically, for he
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ourselves independently from the world. Heidegger's Being-in-the-world is a

says that "knowing," in general, "is a kind of Being which belongs to Being-in-the
world."28 For Heidegger, there is no purely logical or intuitive knowledge of ourselves

which could even be possible, which could even make any sense at all. Dasein is a being
which understands itself, before anything else, through the basic structure of Being-in
the-world.
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Ibid, 84.
28 Ibid 88.
,
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Ergo, Dasein understands itself through sense experience, for sense experience is
all of the ways that we interact with phenomena outside of ourselves, and for Heidegger
all of our existence is lived outside of ourselves, that is to say, as Being-in-the-world:

When Dasein directs itself toward something and grasps it, it does not somehow
first get out of an inner sphere in which it has been proximally encapsulated, but
its primary kind of Being is such that it is always 'outside' alongside entities
which it encounters and which belong to a world already discovered. 29
The above quote is the clearest statement of empiricism I have found in Being and Time,
for here Heidegger baldly says that the way that Dasein knows anything begins in relation
to things outside of Dasein, that is to say, begins with sense experience. The conclusion
to all of this is that Dasein is a being which understands itself empirically.
I will now move from the sweeping claim above to the specific claim that
Heidegger is empiricist in his method. I have two reasons for this. The first is that (a)
Heidegger's phenomenology excludes intuition in the understanding of Dasein because it
requires knowledge to be formed in relation with the phenomenon in question, and (b)
Heidegger's application of phenomenology to Dasein always begins with experience.
It will be easiest to establish (a). As we have already seen, Heidegger's
phenomenology is concerned with revealing the phenomenon of Dasein as it is, rather
than understanding it abstractly in ways that are divorced from what it really is. This
approach, toward "letting something be seen, in letting entities be perceived,"30 requires
that the first step in investigating a phenomenon is to focus on the phenomenon and the
phenomenon only, as Heidegger says, "To have a science 'of phenomena means to grasp
:ztJ
30

Ibid, 89.
Ibid, 58.
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12
its objects in such a way that everything about them which is up for discussion must be
treated by exhibiting it directly and demonstrating it directly."31
If this method is carried out, it will rule out intuition right from the start, for
intuition does not consult the phenomenon in question in order to gain knowledge about
it. Here is Peter Markie's definition of intuition: "Intuition is a form of rational insight.
Intellectually grasping a proposition, we just "see" it to be true in such a way as to form a
true, warranted belief in it. "32 Heidegger's phenomenology has no room for this
approach. In dealing with an abstract phenomenon, like 2 + 5 = 7, there might be a form
of purely abstract phenomenology which takes place, but even then there is a relating to
the phenomenon which is necessary in order to reveal it. In cases where the phenomenon
is in experience, the method is clearly not intuitive, for the method will begin by taking in
sense experience, which has already moved beyond the mode of knowledge that marks
intuition
We will need (b) as well to see how Heidegger is empiricist. Even though
intuition is no factor in phenomenology, it is possible that pure abstraction might be, as I
said above. In applying phenomenology to mathematics or theology, we certainly will not
be dealing with sense experience to reveal these phenomena. Is Heidegger's investigation
of Dasein cut of the same cloth?
The answer is no. Heidegger views Dasein as a being whose nature is founded in
its dynamic existence, and his investigation of it is therefore focused on revealing it from
its existence. He states in the opening to Being and Time that "The 'essence ' ofDasein
lies in its existence ...when we designate this entity with the term 'Dasein', we are
31 Ibid, 59 .
32 Markie.

13
expressing not its "what" (as if it were a table, house or tree) but its Being ... ln each case
Dasein is its possibility."33 Furthennore, because of the "mineness" ofDasein for each of
us, to begin an investigation ofDasein with Dasein is not only good but inevitable. As he
says in the first lines of Division I, "We are ourselves the entities to be analysed. The
Being of any such entity is in each case mine. These entities ... comport themselves
towards their Being."34 This results in the hermeneutic circle we saw above, the fact that
"Any interpretation [ofDasein] which is to contribute understanding, must already have
understood what is to be interpreted. "35
Even at this point, Heidegger might be able to accept all of this and still be a
rationalist, ifhe desired to find some way to get beyond the circle and be objective.
However, Heidegger does just the opposite, and clinches his empiricism by championing
an acceptance of the illogical circularity ofthis investigation of Dasein: "To deny the
circle, to make a secret of it, or even to want to overcome it, means finally to reinforce
this failure [to understand Dasein]. We must rather endeavour to leap into the 'circle',
primordially and wholly, so that even at the start of the analysis of Dasein we make sure
that we have a full view of Dasein's circular Being."36 We can conclude from this that
pure abstraction has no place in Heidegger's understanding of Dasein, and since we know
already that intuition plays no role, we are left to conclude that Heidegger always begins
his examination ofDasein with Dasein in its essence, which is existence; that is to say,
Heidegger examines Dasein empirically.

33 Heidegger, 67w68.
34 Ibid.
3' Ibid, 194.
36
Ibid, 363.
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With these words, my argument is complete. I hope I may have given some
intriguing reasons to see Heidegger as an empiricist. However, you might suspect that I
have emphasized the portions of Being and Time which are most in unison with my
interpretation. Such a suspicion would be correct, for there undoubtedly are other
passages in Being and Time which jar with my interpretation. I have not time to examine
all the many counterpoints which could be made, but I would like to discuss one major
conflict with my thesis which is visible many times in Being and Time.
The objection is Heidegger's use of the phrase a priori to describe Dasein. The
phrase traditionally refers to knowledge which is derived prior to experience, and unless
Heidegger is using the term in a radically new way, my thesis is in danger of going up in
smoke. However, I do believe that Heidegger is using a priori in a completely different
sense, and that it turns out not to conflict with his empiricism .
We will look first at the traditional meaning of a priori. The phrase is Latin,
meaning literally "from before" or "prior to," and it is used by philosophers traditionally
to refer to knowledge which is derived without or before experience, as compared to a
posteriori knowledge, that which is derived from sense experience.37 Bruce Russell says

baldly that "a priori knowledge rests on a priori justification .. . a priori justification is a
type of epistemic justification that is, in some sense, independent of experience."38
Let us now see the phrase in the manner that Heidegger uses it. He uses a priori in
Being and Time as an adjective referring to various elements of Dasein. He defines it in

reference to Being-in-the-world, and says that "In the interpretation of Dasein, this

l7 Markie.
ls Bruce Russell, "A Priori Justification and Knowledge," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall
2008 Edition, ed. Edward N. Zalta.

15
structure [Being-in-the-world] is something 'a priori'; it is not pieced together, but
is ... constantly a whole."39
These two definitions, on the face of it, do not even seem related. I will argue that
they indeed are not. For Heidegger, a priori is not a term applied to knowledge at all, but
is rather an ontological term that references the kind of Being which Dasein is. The basic
meaning of the phrase is also different for Heidegger; he uses the phrase to mean "whole"
rather than "independent of experience." A second example from Being and Time might
provide further insight. Much later on in the book Heidegger discusses the a priori nature
of care, and his discussion here highlights how a priori, for him, is an ontological term,
as he says that '"Earlier' than any presupposition which Dasein makes, or any of its ways
of behaving, is the 'a priori' character of its state of Being as one whose kind of Being is
care."40
From these two examples, I would venture to say that Heidegger calls elements of
Dasein a priori as a way of saying that they are foundational, holistic parts of our nature
before we ever begin to exist as individuals. As he says, they are realities which are "not
pieced together," and which are "earlier than ...any of its [Dasein's] ways of behaving."41
The point is that Dasein' s nature is not compiled or created from experience; it is an
organic whole at the moment it enters experience. The phrase a priori does thereby retain
the original meaning of"prior to," but in reference to Dasein's nature being in existence
before we begin to act as Dasein, not in reference to anything that we know about Dasein
prior to our acting as Dasein. As an ontological term, the phrase has nothing to do with
how Dasein understands itself, which remains an empirical phenomenon because of the
19
40
41

Heidegger, 65.
Ibid, 249.
Ibid, 65, 249.
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fact of Being-in-the-world, which "has nothing to do with any determinate character
restricted beforehand to a worldless subject."42
II
I would now like to make good on my statement of interest in bringing philosophy
back to reality. As my small contribution to this movement, I will discuss the power of
the empiricism present in Martin Heidegger and in William James. This is a power which
shines through the crucial differences between Heidegger and James, and shines through
so that the two have formed an alliance which suffers none for their diversity of opinion.
Let us look briefly at James and his brand of empiricism, to provide the necessary
background to discuss the two together. James, unlike Heidegger, called himself an
empiricist, and he defined the word with characteristic lucidity. In the title essay to his
collection The Will to Believe, he describes the empirical approach to truth by saying that
"as empiricists ... we gain an ever better position towards it by systematically continuing
to roll up experiences and think.',43
James's peculiar form of empiricism is characterized well by the term radical
empiricism, another term that he used himself. For James, to affix radical onto
empiricism means to highlight the overpowering interest that he has in remaining as open

as humanly possible to all possible sources of knowledge about anything at all. This, you
might say, is a pursuit to find the truest form of empiricism possible, where all of our
experience is a potential source of knowing. Here is the concept in Jamesian terms:
Were I obliged to give a short name to the attitude in question, I should call it that
of radical empiricism ...l say 'empiricism,' because it is contented to regard its
42 Ibid, 144.
43
William James, "The Will to Believe," in The Will lo Believe (New York: Dover, 1956), 17,
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17
most assured conclusions concerning matters of fact as hypotheses liable to
modification in the course of future experience; and I say 'radical,'
because it treats the doctrine of monism itself as an hypothesis, and ... it does not
dogmatically affirm monism as something with which all experience has got to
square. 44
I should make a note about monism here. This is what James means for the idea
that the universe, when it comes down to it, is a consistent, unified phenomenon; it is the
idea that the confusion and ambiguity that is always evident to us is a result of this or that
temporary effect, but behind it is a solidified universe, even if we cannot see it. 45 James,
of course, intends to open up discussion for whether we have much reason to believe any
such thing, and whether the situation might rather be that there is no foundational unity to
the universe at all, what he calls pluralism. 46
Now we shall see where Heidegger intersects with all of this Jamesian
empiricism. The great distinction between the two lies in the divide which James has
called monism v. pluralism; Heidegger is solidly monist, and James is undoubtedly
pluralist. Heidegger is concerned always with understanding Being as something
universal, as made up of elements which are fundamental to the existence to all and
which elements together form a great whole. We have seen this above in his
interpretation of Dasein as an a priori whole. Inversely, James has given up hope for
finding such a consistency anywhere in our existence, and rather is interested in pursuing

�

44

William James, Preface to The Will to Believe (New York: Dover, 1956), vii-viii .
45 William James, Pragmatism (New York: Barnes & Noble, 2003), 70.
46
James, Preface to The Will to Believe, ix.
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the idea that maybe the world is simply not one, for we are left in our existence with "the
common sense world, in which we find things partly joined and partly disjoined."47
We have here a universalist empiricist and a pluralist empiricist, we might say. As
a Jamesian myself, I am prone to interpret Heidegger's universalism as a form of
empiricism which has not grown strong enough yet to face the realities of pluralism
which James recognized. This intriguing view is presented by Richard Rorty in his
Essays on Heidegger and others, where he interprets Heidegger as being unable, unlike

thinkers like William James and John Dewey, to give up entirely the idea of a final and
comprehensive interpretation of life and its meaning.48 He characterizes Heidegger's
project of describing Dasein as "the hope that Heidegger himself, his Thinking, will be a
decisive event in the History of Being," where others like James and Dewey "hope that
things may tum out well in the end, but their sense of contingency does not permit them
to write dramatic narratives... They exemplify a virtue which Heidegger preached, but
was not himself able to practice. "49 I would be happy to see this interpretation be ever
more popularized. Those of us who call ourselves pluralists must always remember,
though, that our pluralism is never orthodoxy, for we are always empiricists; I stand with
Rorty's interpretation not because it is Biblical truth, but because it bests fits the evidence
that I have found thus far. As long as we maintain this stance, we maintain our
empiricism undiminished.
That is enough on the contrast between Heidegger and James. I would like to end
by seeing how the alliance of empiricism between the two is stronger than their
47 James, Pragmatism, 71.
Richard Rorty, Introduction to Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1982), xviii.
49
Richard Rorty, "Heidegger, Contingency, and Pragmatism," in Essays on Heidegger and others
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 49.

48
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divergences. This is an alliance that is founded on a simple agreement, which is the belief
that we open up the possibility to live better and know better about ourselves and the
world if we approach our experience open to what we can learn from it.
The alliance is for this full-blooded kind of empiricism, and against a straitjacket
of rationality which both Heidegger and James believe to have clouded philosophy for
too long; they are united in a desire to open up vistas of understanding which are possible
only by stripping away our crusty systems of thought and approaching life as it
organically is. Heidegger calls it a fight against the "logic of consistency," against
"technical devices" and "conceptions which only seem to have been demonstrated,"50
where James sees it as abandoning "the doctrine of objective certitude" and "scholastic
orthodoxy."51
What Heidegger and James find once they get beyond these orthodoxies is the
real treasure, for it is real understanding about the real life which was hidden before .
Heidegger's weapon of revelation is the phenomenological method, which allows him to
reveal the Dasein that has been there all along, with its Being-in-the-world, care,
potentiality-for-Being, and so forth; these are realities which cannot be proven by
abstraction, but are nonetheless real. James fights with the torch of radical empiricism,
which moves beyond the constraints of the orthodoxy of science to open up the
possibility of real interaction with such mysterious forces as "real ends, real evil, real
crises ... a real God, and a real moral life," forces which we may be very real but which
we eulogize far too hastily because they jar with our systems of rationality. 52

50

Heidegger, 51.
James, "The Will to Believe," 13- I 5 .
52 James, Preface to The Will to Believe, ix .
51
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Like allies who maintain their distance in the day-to-day but come together in
times of crises, such are Heidegger and James. They are allied in their empiricism, in
their unswerving faith in revealing what the world we live in can tell us about who we
are. This is the lucid and powerful essence of empiricism. the kind of empiricism which
means something real to more than just philosophers.
The power of this empiricism is the perpetual challenge it issues to the
orthodoxies we build around ourselves like cocoons and to the half-truths we systematize
and teach to our children. It can open our eyes to see brothers and sisters who are
different as people where we did not before, and to listen without reservation to their
stories where before their stories could not have entered in the doors of our minds, for
now our minds have become broader, as James says, our empiricism "lies in the midst of
our theories, like a corridor in a hotel. Innumerable chambers open out of it. ..but they all
own the corridor, and all must pass through it."53 It can open our eyes to see beyond the
empty towers of theological rigor that we build to encapsulate God, and in so doing it can
rebirth a fresh and open pursuit of the divine, what Heidegger called "a more primordial
interpretation of man's Being toward God, prescribed by the meaning of faith itself and
remaining within it."54 The empiricism of Heidegger and James has the power to bring us
together despite our differences, to release us from our conceptual bondage so that we
can see the beauty of existence, of Dasein, in ways we never have before.
In the end, it is up to each of us to make our choices, about what we will think and
how we will live. We all know that it is difficult, to keep fighting against the absurd
pressures of life, day after day, no end in sight. We will make different choices, we will
53
54

Pragmatism, 24.
Heidegger, 30.
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take different paths; perhaps our paths wiU converge, perhaps not. I can ask of you only
what I must ask of myself, and what Heidegger and James shone bright in doing: never
settle for half-truths and half-lies when hope for more is still alive.

Sleeping is giving in, no matter what the time is
Sleeping is giving in, so lift those heavy eyelids

-Arcade Fire
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